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In the two years from 2009 to 2011, Greece
has gone from being one of the European coun-
tries most critical of Israel to being one of the
most supportive. This transition has progressed
just as ties between Israel and Turkey have dete-
riorated. Strategic cooperation in the areas of
military, the economy, and energy are rapidly
developing in concert with exchanges of leaders
and diplomats. In many ways it seems that
Greece is a second-best ally for Israel, a small
consolation to Israel at the loss of a good rela-
tionship with Turkey. Though Greece’s rela-
tive value to Israel may be questionable, a
careful examination of the history and possi-
bilities of a relationship between Greece and
Israel will show that the bilateral relationship
between the two states has the potential to be
stronger and more enduring than the once-
promising relationship between Israel and
Turkey had been.
Setting the Stage: Greece, Turkey,
and Cyprus
The relations among Greece, Israel, and
Turkey cannot be productively examined with-
out an understanding of the dynamic among
Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. The rivalry between
Greece and Turkey is one of the oldest in the
world between neighboring nations. The two
countries have been in a state of détente since
1999 and are mutually committed to a settle-
ment of their issues, but attempts have not been
successful. The current issues that define their
relationship are the divided island of Cyprus and
territory disputes in the Aegean. Turkey has
occupied the northern portion of the island of
Cyprus since it invaded in 1974 in response to
a Greek-backed military coup. The Republic of
Cyprus is the only internationally recognized
government on the island. The thirty-six percent
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of the island that is occupied by Turkey is gov-
erned by the Republic of Northern Cyprus, a
government recognized only by Turkey. Despite
many efforts to resolve the conflict on Cyprus,
the island remains divided. Cyprus is a promi-
nent factor in the foreign policies of both Greece
and Turkey.
The dispute in the Aegean concerns the
delimitation of territorial waters and airspace
surrounding the many small Greek islands scat-
tered throughout the sea. According to the
United Nations Convention Law of the Sea,
which Greece has signed but Turkey has not, a
country is entitled to full control of an area that
extends twelve nautical miles from its coastline.
Currently, Greece and Turkey claim territorial
waters at six nautical miles. If Greece claimed
the full twelve miles, much of the Aegean,
including portions very near to Turkey’s coast,
would be in Greek control. Turkey feels that this
claim would give Greece disproportionate con-
trol over the waters and airspace and has stated
that if Greece were to extend its territorial
waters to twelve nautical miles that would be
cause for war. Greece is concerned that Turkey
will try to establish a zone of influence in the
center of the Aegean that would cut off the
Greek islands from the mainland. This dispute
is one aspect of a larger Greek fear: that Turkey
is working to establish itself as a regional
hegemon and will try to halt the geopolitical and
economic advances of Cyprus (Dokos).
The rivalry between Greece and Turkey is
a defining aspect of the countries’ respective for-
eign policies. Both states continuously seek to
raise support for their positions on the issues of
Cyprus and Aegean from the United States,
the United Nations, and the broader interna-
tional community. The Turkish and Greek
relationships with Israel have played into this
strategy in different ways throughout their
recent histories and have become an increas-
ingly important part of the dynamic in the East-
ern Mediterranean.
The Foundations of Cooperation:
Greek-Israeli and Turkish-Israeli ties
in the Years 1949–1990
Prior to these recent developments, the
relationship between Greece and Israel was his-
torically cool and distant. After Greece officially
recognized the state of Israel in 1949, diplomatic
representation between the two states remained
at the level of chargé d’affaires—not at the level
of ambassador—for forty years. The two states
were not hostile, but they remained detached.
Throughout these years, a strong pro-Pales-
tinian position among Greek leadership and
peoples, as well as a heavy dependence upon
Arab oil and a desire for Arab support in the
UN on the Cyprus issue, led Athens to court the
Arab states rather than foster relations with
Israel. During this time Greece believed that
positive relations with Arab states would be eco-
nomically beneficial (Athanassopoulou).
In 1981, Greece became a member of the
Economic Community (EC). Membership in the
EC encouraged Greece to normalize relations
with Israel. As did Turkey at this time, then-
Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who had
been very publicly pro-Palestinian, began to view
the American-Jewish lobby as a potential avenue
through which to gain support in Washington
on the Cyprus and Aegean issues and attract
potential investors. In 1988, Athens upgraded
diplomatic relations with Israel, and in 1990,
under the leadership of the center-right party
New Democracy, Greece was the last member
of the EC to offer de jure recognition to Israel.
The Arab-Israeli peace talks at the time facili-
tated the increased recognition: they heightened
the legitimacy of the Israeli state in the eyes of
the Greek populace and made it easier for Greek
leaders to respond to negative reactions from
both their constituents and the Arab states.
The potential support of the American-Jewish
lobby on the Cyprus issue, as well as the oppor-
tunities for investment and the chance to
counter Turkey, remained an important objec-
tive in Athens and was a strong factor in the deci-
sion for Athens to sign a military accord with
Israel in 1994. The military accord, which was
signed under PASOK, the center-left party of
Andreas Papandreou, never came to fruition
because of pressures from both Syria and the
members of PASOK, who were not supportive of
developing ties with Israel. Thus, the Greek-
Israeli relationship remained fairly stagnant until
the end of the decade (Athanassopoulou).
The Turkish-Israeli relationship also did
not begin with a promising start. Turkey was the
only Muslim state to recognize Israel in 1949,
though the two states remained distant. In the
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1980s, relations warmed between the states as
Turkish leadership pursued improved rela-
tions with the U.S. Turkey believed a relation-
ship with Israel would foster this movement.
Turkey lacked a significant diaspora in the
United States and thus needed a strategy for gar-
nering support in Congress. Turkey wanted to
prevent Congress from using the word genocide
to describe the massacre and deportation of
Armenians after World War I and also sought
support in Congress on the issue of the divided
island of Cyprus. For Turkey, a relationship with
the American-Jewish lobby was a means of gain-
ing a voice and a form of representation in Con-
gress. The cooperation was successful, and the
relationship between Turkey and Israel flour-
ished. The U.S. encouraged efforts by the two
states in hopes that a strategic alliance might be
formed that would alter the balance of power in
the Middle East. Turkey was the primary actor
in this situation, with the United States pro-
viding support and motivation.
Greece’s decision to upgrade diplomatic
relations with Israel in the late 1980s was
made partially in response to the expanding
cooperation between Turkey and Israel. Greece
previously was not interested because it viewed
the situation as a “zero-sum game”: Turkey had
the upper hand in the situation, so Greece
believed it could not gain anything by devel-
oping ties with Israel. But, under Prime Min-
ister Kostas Simitis in the late 1990s, an expan-
sion of U.S.-Greek ties encouraged improved
relations with Israel. Foreign Ministry officials
in the Simitis government further promoted the
idea that a closer relationship between Greece
and Israel would somehow prevent Israel and
Turkey from continuing to expand ties so exten-
sively. Of most interest to Greece were the
purchases that Turkey was making from Israel
to upgrade and modernize its weapons, as well
as the joint air force training programs and
the exchange of industrial technologies between
the two states (Nachmani). Turkey was being
strengthened through its military purchases and
training from Israel; this new military rela-
tionship introduced an element of unpre-
dictability into the region. Athens was con-
cerned that an increase in military power and
strategic cooperation with Israel would lead
Turkey to feel more secure along its eastern bor-
der, which could result in increased Turkish
aggression in the Aegean and a shift in the
balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Athens was also concerned that this cooperation
would elevate Turkey to a position of stronger
regional importance for the U.S. and that Turkey
would gain the support of the American-Jew-
ish lobby (Athanassopoulou).
In addition to working to prevent a deep-
ening of the Turkish-Israeli relationship, the
Simitis government sought to become more
integrated into the European Union (EU); one
strategy to this end was to align itself more fully
with the EU in foreign policy matters. Athens
therefore began creating a more specific pol-
icy toward Israel, which was facilitated by the
election of Ehud Barak in 1999. Barak was
considered more open to dialogue with Pales-
tine (Hadjistassou). 
Greek-Israeli trade increased substantially
throughout the 1990s: by 2004, Israel was
importing $242 million from Greece, and
Greece was importing $142 million from Israel.
There was also an increase in Israeli tourism
to Greece. Israeli President Moshe Katsav
declared Greece an important economic part-
ner and a gateway to the Balkans (Damiras). 
Israel was also interested in improving
relations with Greece. Athens had reacted neg-
atively to the publicity surrounding the
strengthening of relations between Israel and
Turkey in 1996. Israel did not want to alienate
Greece, and therefore Cyprus as well, prima-
rily because doing so would violate Israeli for-
eign policy, which advocates good relations with
every state. And although Turkey was an impor-
tant player in the Middle East, Greece was an
access point to the EU, both as an air route
and a potential supporter. Israel had not yet been
successful in gaining widespread favor in the EU
and considered EU financial assistance crucial
to achieving peace in the region. Though its
relationship with Turkey was paramount and
forming a strategic partnership with Greece was
not a priority, Israel nonetheless sought bilat-
eral relations with Athens through trade and
economic cooperation (Athanassopoulou).
The Development and Deterioration
of Israeli-Turkish Relations
In the late 1990s, Turkey and Israel con-
tinued to develop their relationship by signing
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military cooperation and free-trade agreements.
These accords signaled the start of coopera-
tion between Turkey and Israel. They contained
contracts for the sale of Israeli military equip-
ment and weapons to Turkey as well as the
use of Turkish airspace in exchange for Israeli
training in advanced warfare. The growth of the
relationship between Turkey and Israel at this
time focused on military collaboration and
primarily benefitted the Turkish military, which
was effectively running the country. The rul-
ing party, forced by the military to cooperate,
did not support the developing relationship; nor
did the Turkish populace, which had long been
pro-Palestinian (Barkey).
The Turkish-Israeli relationship expanded
to include economic cooperation, the creation
of Qualified Industrial Zones, and search and
rescue operations. As a result of the partnership,
Turkey was able to obtain quality military equip-
ment from Israel and demonstrate to the U.S.
that it was an important partner in the region.
The continued relationship with Israel effec-
tively served as evidence for this advancement.
Turkey was also able to gain the support of the
American-Jewish lobby in Congress (Barkey).
The military agreements between Turkey and
Israel were of great value to the Israeli defense
industry. Israel benefitted from the use of Turk-
ish airspace for training—an exigency because
Israeli airspace is so narrow and the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) relies on air power. It
also enjoyed the political significance of train-
ing in Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country
with extensive partnerships and networks
throughout the Arab world. The major benefit
to Israel, however, was the close connection to
a state that has such cultural and historic ties
in the Middle East (Nachmani).
The cooperation between Turkey and Israel
had potential to be strong and productive. An
economic and military partnership between two
democratic and economically strong states
could bring stability to a region marked by
authoritarian governments. Turkey could poten-
tially act as a mediator or even become a local
hegemon with which Israel could be comfort-
able (Barkey). Both states could benefit econom-
ically from the increase in trade (Nachmani).
After a promising beginning, relations
between Turkey and Israel began a rapid dete-
rioration following the Gaza War in 2008. The
Turks abandoned their efforts to maintain
strong relations and began speaking out with
strong rhetoric against Israel. In May 2010,
Israel intercepted a Turkish flotilla bound for
Gaza, and, in the process, nine Turkish activists
were killed. This event effectively terminated the
era of Turkish-Israel cooperation. In the fall of
2011, the Israeli ambassador was expelled from
Turkey. Military and defense deals were sus-
pended. Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey
began using increasingly harsh rhetoric against
Israel, even publicly humiliating the Israeli
leader on stage at Davos. The rhetoric was well-
received in Turkey but, as it continued to esca-
late, incited warnings from the international
community. The rift in their relationship would
not be easily overcome.
The rapid decline of such a promising part-
nership was possible because it had been formed
at the highest levels of the Turkish state and the
Israeli government. The relationship was based
on cooperation between the military leadership
of the two states. When the Justice and Devel-
opment Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey,
it began to rein in the power of the military and
had little incentive to continue the partnership.
The relationship never had strong domestic sup-
port in Turkey, whose citizens tend to support
Palestine and distrust Israel. Harsh anti-Israeli
rhetoric by AKP leadership was thus well-
received by the Turkish populace (Barkey).
An important factor in the deterioration of
ties between Turkey and Israel is that their rela-
tionship was never truly bilateral; rather, it
was formed as more of a triangular relationship
among Turkey, the United States, and Israel,
with Turkey being the primary actor and driver.
Turkey had pursued a relationship with Israel
with the goal of becoming a more important
partner to the U.S. and garnering support in the
U.S. Congress. The U.S. eagerly supported the
relationship. The growth of its economy as
well as its progression along the path to EU
membership had led Turkey to become a strong
regional power. Turkey’s strategic location, as
well as its ties to the Middle East and eco-
nomic and military strength, led it to feel less
dependent upon Israel and the American-Jew-
ish lobby to show the United States that it was
an important regional ally (Barkey).
Though the Turkish-Israeli relationship
seemed to hold a great deal of potential for
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collaboration and cooperation in the Eastern
Mediterranean, the lack of domestic support
in Turkey and the increasing strength and
confidence of Turkey made the relationship
weaker than it appeared. This weakness allowed
the Turkish leadership to quickly halt the devel-
opment of ties with Israel in the wake of the
Gaza War and the flotilla crisis.
A New Era of Strategic Cooperation
between Greece and Israel
As the Turkish-Israeli relationship dete-
riorated, Greece eagerly moved to fill the gap.
Though Athens maintains that improved rela-
tions with Israel should not be seen as com-
petitive to relations with any other state, both
Greek and Israeli leaders have acknowledged
that the weakening of the Turkish-Israeli rela-
tionship made way for the Greek-Israeli relation-
ship to develop (Bushinsky). Greece hoped
that the break between Israel and Turkey would
decrease Turkey’s support in Washington. Thus,
the years from 2009 to 2012 have seen a rapid
increase of cooperation between Greece and
Israel. This new era of cooperation began in
2009 with communication between Prime Min-
isters Binyamin Netanyahu and George Papan-
dreou and has expanded to include a wide
array of diplomatic visits, military agreements,
and civilian cooperation. 
After the Gaza flotilla incident, the two
states exchanged diplomatic visits. In July 2010,
Papandreou made an official visit to Jerusalem.
The following month Netanyahu became the
first Israeli Prime Minister to visit Greece. He
described cooperation between the two states
as “natural,” stating that the visit would fix a
62-year-old abnormality (Hoffman). During this
visit, Papandreou and Netanyahu discussed the
expansion of strategic ties and greater coop-
eration between their militaries and related
industries. This cooperation materialized a few
months later, in October, when Israeli and
Greek air forces trained jointly over Greek
airspace. At this time, the two states signed the
Aviation Treaty, the first treaty signed by the
two countries since 1952. In January 2011,
Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman
made a visit to Athens and set up a joint com-
mittee for strategic security cooperation to
work together on anti-terror issues. Finally, on
September 4th of 2011, Greek Defense Minis-
ter Panagiotis Beglitis and Israeli Defense Min-
ister Ehud Barak signed a security cooperation
agreement. The leaders cited the difficult times
that both Israel and Greece were experiencing
and the importance of cooperation. Barak
stated, “We are seeing with satisfaction the
deepening and widening of relations between
us and the Greeks in all sectors, including the
security sector, and we desire to see the deep-
ening and widening of this cooperation between
the governments, between the Defense Min-
istries and between our peoples” (JTA). That
same month Greece created a legal frame-
work that allows Jews born in Greece in or
before 1945 to reclaim Greek, and thus EU, cit-
izenship. This agreement affects only 350
people but is a symbolic gesture of inclusion by
the Greeks (Tziampiris).
In 2011, a second flotilla of ships
attempted to leave a Greek port for Gaza. Greek
inspectors banned the vessels from leaving the
port, following a close interpretation of the law.
One vessel left anyway and was pursued by
Greek speedboats. This was a risky move for
Greek officials, but they were able to force the
vessel to return. The Greeks were praised by the
U.S., the UN, the EU, Israel, and the Palestin-
ian Authority (Tziampiris). The budding rela-
tionship was able to withstand an interna-
tional crisis, and Greece demonstrated that
Israel is now a priority for Greek leaders
(Athanassopoulou).
Greece has rushed to fill in the gap cre-
ated when Turkey ceased cooperation with
Israel. In many ways, however, Greece cannot
fill that gap. Greece has long maintained a rela-
tionship with the Arab world, but it is not nearly
as strong as Turkey’s. Even in the best eco-
nomic situation, Greece would not be able to
make such large weapons purchases from Israel
as did Turkey; currently, Greece is not in a posi-
tion to purchase weapons, equipment, or
defense technology. Compared to the Turkish
population of 63 million, the Greek popula-
tion of 12 million represents a significantly
smaller non-military market as well (Bushin-
sky). Though Greece cannot provide Israel with
all of the benefits it received from its rela-
tionship with Turkey, Israel does seek to gain
in some ways. Cooperation with Greece in the
exploitation of the natural gas recently 
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discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean will
enhance Israel’s strategic position in gas field
exploitation and EEZ delimitation (Damiras).
The Greek and Israeli armed forces have begun
cooperation, and Israel is able to use Greek air-
space for training purposes. Greece is farther
from Israel than Turkey, so the IDF can carry
out long-range flights (Iserovich). Now that
Israel and Turkey are no longer cooperating,
Israel also has an interest in counterbalanc-
ing Turkey’s power in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean. Finally, a strong partnership with an
EU member state can help to alleviate any
isolation that Israel may be feeling after los-
ing a strong partner in the international com-
munity. Greece can potentially help to improve
diplomatic and trade relations between Israel
and the EU (Damiras).
Greece stands to benefit from a relation-
ship with Israel in a variety of ways aside from
the oft-cited connection with the American-Jew-
ish lobby. The Greek army has received military
training and expertise from the IDF. The mili-
taries have practiced joint air maneuvers, com-
bat search and rescue missions, and long-range
combat missions. During Netanyahu’s visit to
Israel, the leaders discussed coordinating intel-
ligence strategies, sharing sensitive intelligence
data, and collaborating in high-level strategic
sessions. Cooperation with Israel also furthered
Papandreou’s goal of strengthening Greece’s
image as a regional peace negotiator. Greek
leaders have cited their historic ties with the
Arab world and experience with conflict and
splits as an asset to the peace process. Involve-
ment in the peace process can help to bolster
Greek prestige even during the economic cri-
sis and the resulting tension with the EU (Beck).
Cultural and Civilian Ties between
Greece and Israel
In promoting their developing relationship
in the news media and public appearances, lead-
ers of both Greece and Israel have been drawing
upon the cultural ties between the two states.
These ties were easily ignored by leaders during
times of cooler relations—they are not politi-
cally salient enough to actually inspire coop-
eration—but leaders have been utilizing these
cultural ties to create an image of a culturally
similar, if not quite shared, past. 
The common experiences of the Greek and
Israeli peoples that are being highlighted by
political leadership extend far back in history,
to a time when both peoples were creators
and disseminators of culture. Both nations
feel a strong sense of pride for their cultural
contributions and historic achievements. Lead-
ers have been broadly discussing the shared val-
ues of the two nations based on their similar cul-
tural histories. The Greek and Jewish peoples
were both subjugated by the Ottomans and
managed to influence the economic life of the
Ottoman Empire (Damiras). The peoples also
share a more recent history of suffering under
the Nazis: Greece was briefly occupied by the
Nazis and fought against them, whereas Turkey
remained neutral until the end of WWII
(Bushinsky). Currently, both the Israeli and
Greek peoples have very large international dias-
poras, especially within the United States. These
diasporas are very connected to events and
issues of national interest in their respective
homelands and are politically active in their cur-
rent homes as well. Cooperation between the
two diasporas can be mutually beneficial both
for local concerns as well as concerns of national
interest. Greece and Israel held a joint dias-
pora conference in May 2011 to foster cooper-
ation among diaspora groups. The developing
relationship between the two states has allowed
Greece to court the American-Jewish Diaspora
more actively. In 2010, Greece hosted the Con-
ference for the Presidents of Major American-
Jewish Organizations. Greece continues to seek
support from these organizations on the Cyprus
issue and is especially interested at present in
encouraging investment. Greek leaders have
regularly come to visit with American-Jewish
organizations whenever they visit the U.S.
Greece and Israel also share important
religious ties. The Greek Orthodox commu-
nity has a strong interest in Israeli holy sites,
and many Greek Orthodox pilgrims visit Israel
each year during religious holidays. The Patri-
archate of the Greek Orthodox Church is the
second largest landowner in Israel after the state
itself. Religion is an important part of the cul-
ture of both Greece and Israel and can serve
as a powerful and convenient building block for
collaboration among citizens.
In addition to the cultural ties between
the two states, economic ties are also being
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developed. Most immediate has been the rise in
Israeli tourism to Greece, which increased by
200 percent between 2009 and 2010, and by
an additional 15 percent in 2011. In recent
years, Greece has replaced Turkey as a popu-
lar destination for many Israeli tourists. The
two states are also working on an Israel-Greece
tourism package to promote to tourists (Tziam-
piris). Greece hopes to attract Israeli invest-
ment at both the public and private sectors.
Leaders have also cited cooperation in agri-
culture and desalination. In 2008, Greece
imported $221.4 million worth of products
from Israel; by 2011 this number had increased
to $263.5 million. Israeli exports to Cyprus
jumped from $68.7 million in 2008 to $318.9
million in 2011 (State of Israel).
Greek leaders are actively promoting this
cooperation to the Greek and Israeli publics.
In 2010, the Greek government invited Israeli
journalists to a series of meetings held among
high-ranking Greek and Israeli officials specif-
ically to highlight the level of bilateral histori-
cal ties (Beck). The fact that leaders can conjure
such a memory for their citizens may be a
critical difference in the relationship between
Greco-Israeli and Turko-Israeli relationships.
The process of drawing upon common cul-
tural experience was not possible with Turkey.
Turkey is a predominantly Muslim nation with
extensive contacts throughout the Arab world,
which was politically beneficial but prevented
the type of cultural-inclusivity rhetoric that is
now creating a foundation of support among the
peoples of Greece and Israel. Even after years of
close military, economic, and political coopera-
tion between Israel and Turkey, Turkish lead-
ership was quickly able to draw popular support
away from Israel.
The process of creating the image of a
common cultural experience is crucial to gain-
ing the support of the Greek and Israeli publics
for cooperation between the two states. By
creating a picture of similarity between the
Greek and Israeli communities, both states
are beginning a process of inclusion that will
help prevent cultural “othering” in the future.
The Greek-Israeli relationship will go deeper
than economic exchanges and military coop-
eration: they are involving their citizens in
building a foundation of shared culture and his-
torical experience.
Natural Gas in the Eastern
Mediterranean
The natural gas that has recently been dis-
covered in the Eastern Mediterranean off the
coasts of Israel and Cyprus is providing oppor-
tunities and incentives for increased military
and economic cooperation among Israel,
Greece, and Cyprus. The Tamar Field, off the
coast of Israel, contains an estimated 300 billion
cubic meters (BCM) of natural gas, which would
be enough to supply Israel’s domestic needs
for approximately twenty years, during which
time the estimated gas requirement of the coun-
try is 15 BCM per year. Tamar will begin supply-
ing Israel with gas in 2013. The Leviathan
field contains an estimated 500 BCM, which
could be available for export. This field extends
into forty square miles of Cyprus’s Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), and may contain as
much as eight trillion cubic feet of natural gas
(Brodet). The original estimate of the gas dis-
covered off the coast of Cyprus in Lot 12 came
to $400 billion worth, at potentially 11 trillion
cubic feet, which could make Cyprus energy
independent for 200 years (Abdel-Kader).
Turkey has been very opposed to this gas
exploration and threatened that, if Noble Energy
proceeded with drilling, the company would not
be permitted to do business in Turkey. The com-
pany continued drilling in cooperation with
Israeli companies. In August 2011, the Turk-
ish Foreign Minister condemned Cyprus as vio-
lating international law, though Cyprus’s action
is supported by many in the international
community. Turkey has not found international
support for its opposition (Tziampiris), and
exploration has continued. 
Greece, Israel, and Cyprus have been coop-
erating to ensure the secure exploitation and
successful distribution of these resources.
Greece may serve as a safe outlet for Israeli nat-
ural gas and a hub through which it can be
transported to the EU, an immediate market for
gas exports. Israel had been considering lay-
ing a land pipeline through Turkey to the EU,
but with such tense relations a pipeline through
Greece is a more secure option. Though this
option is more secure, it is less energy efficient,
so Israel has been considering building a nat-
ural gas liquefaction plant on Cyprus as an alter-
native. Once the gas is in liquid form it can be
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more efficiently transported to the EU. Such a
role in the energy system would greatly bene-
fit Cyprus, which would gain both regional
importance and geopolitical leverage. This gas
could help diversify the European energy sup-
ply, which is primarily comprised of Russian
natural gas, and thereby increase European
energy security (Hadjistassou). Greece stands to
benefit by becoming an energy hub, and Israel
would gain importance as a European partner. 
Another option for Israel is to export gas
to Asia, where demand for energy is high.
Exporting gas to Asia would be possible only
with the construction of special liquefaction
facilities, which would be costly but might be
justified by the high price of gas in the grow-
ing Asian market. Israeli entrepreneurs are cur-
rently weighing these options and working with
Cyprus to develop this project. The natural
gas discovery has provided a shared strategic
interest among Cyprus, Israel, and Greece
(Brodet).
Greece, Cyprus, and Israel have begun to
coordinate political and military actions as well
as energy exploration activities. This loose
alliance is a threat to the dominance that Turkey
has enjoyed in the Eastern Mediterranean,
and Turkey has interfered with Cypriot explo-
ration of its sea bed. As the three states continue
to coordinate energy and military activities, the
loose alliance grows stronger. This coordination
has the potential to extend and develop as
energy is extracted from the region for many
years to come. The successful exploitation of the
gas will require close cooperation among
Greece, Israel, and Cyprus, and the economic
and political benefits will provide a strong incen-
tive for positive relations well into the future.
Moving Forward
The Turkish-Israeli relationship was
formed at the highest levels of government
and thus was vulnerable to changes in politi-
cal leadership. The Greek-Israeli relationship
also began at the highest levels of power and
benefitted from a close relationship between
Prime Ministers Netanyahu and Papandreou.
Greek leadership, however, sought to make a
relationship with Israel a permanent part of
Greek foreign policy, and both primary political
parties, PASOK and New Democracy, supported
the relationship. Greek leaders built support
among the Greek populace by developing oppor-
tunities for business and civilian collaboration
and drawing upon shared cultural experience of
the Greek and Jewish peoples. The Greek gov-
ernment has reached out to American-Jewish
organizations and successfully formed relation-
ships with them. Unlike the relationship
between Turkey and Israel, which was formed
only at the highest levels of government with-
out public support, relations between Greece
and Israel are the comprehensive result of a
coordinated effort among multiple sectors and
primary Greek political parties. The work done
by Greek and Israeli leadership to promote
this relationship will enable the current atmos-
phere of collaboration to endure succeeding
administrations. 
The change in Greek leadership in the
fall of 2011 could have posed a threat to the new
partnership, but before Papandreou stepped
down in the fall, Israeli leaders had already
begun cultivating ties with New Democracy.
Soon after Papandreou left office, Israeli ambas-
sador to Greece Aryeh Mekel sent a cable to
the Foreign Ministry that stressed the impor-
tance of “continuing Papandreouism without
Papandreou” (Keinon). Both Greek and Israeli
leaders have made strong relations a policy that
extends beyond specific administrations. Since
the transition government has come to power,
diplomatic visits between the two states have
continued.
The warming of the Greek-Israeli relation-
ship has brought a new dynamic to the East-
ern Mediterranean. Though it has largely been
the result of the deterioration of the Israeli-
Turkish relationship, and though Greece can-
not quite fill the gap left by Turkey in Israel’s
foreign politics, the relationship offers its own
array of mutual benefits, such as military,
business, and energy cooperation. The exploita-
tion of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean
will provide a strong incentive for coopera-
tion. The relationship has proven strong enough
to survive international incidents and a change
of Greek administration and shows great prom-
ise that it will continue to thrive and develop.
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